Electrolux EU 0561 C Uživatelský manuál stáhnout pdf (Strana 16)

PAGE 16 EC COMPETITION POLICY NEWSLETTER Vol. 1, N° 2, Summer 1994

market shares and the relevant concentration ratios, the new

draft does offer them some important advantages. For the

companies concluding agreements where the thresholds are

met, the new approach is disadvantageous, as they will have

to notify their agreements on Form A/B, which is expensive

and time-consuming.

The purpose of the present consultation period is,

inter alia,

to enable the Commission to balance these advantages and

disadvantages.

Those wishing a copy of the draft Regulation should write

or fax to:

Sebastiano Guttuso, Head of Sector, DG IV-2-A

Commission of the European Communities

Rue de la Loi 200

B - 1040 Brussels

Telefax: 32.2.295. 01.28

Regarding decisions adopted by the Commission in

individual cases, two cases have dominated what has been a

productive second semester. The first, and no doubt the

most important, is the adoption of the Cartonboard

decision.

In 1994 the Commission, acting on a complaint, carried out

surprise inspections at sixteen different companies within the

European Union, where it discovered detailed evidence of

the existence of a widespread price and quota fixing cartel

agreement. The existing producers decided to jointly

increase prices, whilst maintaining supply and demand in

balance by agreeing production limits, to avoid "excessive"

production.

Aside from the blatantly illegal acts of the companies

concerned, one of the most interesting elements of this case

is the extent to which the companies attempted to disguise

the existence of the cartel. Not only were there clear

understandings amongst the cartel members to ensure that

records of cartel meetings were not kept, but the companies

even went so far as to attempt to disguise their joint prices

rises as oligopolistic price following, by agreeing that one

company would announce "its" price rise first, with others

"following" after an agreed period. The fact that

notwithstanding these considerable efforts at escaping

detection the Commission gathered more than adequate

evidence to prove the existence of a cartel illustrates the fact

that it is simply not possible to run a cartel with the certainty

that one will be able to escape detection.

It has always been the Commission's policy to fine such

cartels heavily, and the present case was no exception. A

total of 132.15 million ECU was imposed on a total of 19

companies. One company, Stora, received a significantly

reduced fine because shortly after the inspection it

cooperated actively with the Commission by providing it

important evidence regarding the existence and operation of

the cartel. Other producers that provided similar evidence,

but at a much later stage of the procedure, received

significantly lower reductions. The largest fine imposed on

a single company was 22,75 million ECU.

The second major event was the successful conclusion of the

negotiations with Microsoft

, acting hand-in-hand with the US

Department of Justice. This is discussed in more detail in

the press release figuring below. Chistopher JONES

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